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WHEN THERE ARE NO RANDOMIZED
CONTROLLED TRIALS:
A CASE HISTORY OF A CONTROVERSIAL
PROCEDURE FOR METASTATIC BREAST CANCER
Jeffrey C. Lerner, Ph.D. & Diane C. Robertson *
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1990s, judges were in the position of having to
make decisions in cases on high-dose chemotherapy (HDC) with
autologous bone marrow or stem cell transplantation (ABMT/SCT)
without the benefit of sound medical evidence, and were
inadvertently unable to provide a societal check on access to an
ineffective, and at times, life-threatening healthcare technology.
This unfortunate circumstance was not mitigated by the ability of
federal judges to qualify expert witnesses under the principles of
the Daubert decision, despite the growing use of Daubert
principles in 1990s.1 The most credible expert witnesses had been
proponents of this ineffective medical procedure.
If the concepts of “evidence” in medical and judicial decision
making were congruent, adjudication would be less complex. The
case we present on high-dose chemotherapy (HDC) with
*

Jeffrey C. Lerner, Ph.D., is the President and CEO of ECRI. Diane C.
Robertson, B.A., is the Director of Health Technology Assessment Services at
ECRI. ECRI is an independent, private non-profit health services research
agency designated as an Evidence-based Practice Center by the U.S. Agency for
Health Research and Quality and as a collaborating center of the World Health
Organization in technology assessment, healthcare risk management, and patient
safety. ECRI and its officers and staff adhere to strict conflict-of-interest rules
that prevent owning stock in drug and medical device companies and health
plans. ECRI HOME PAGE, http://www.ecri.org/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2006).
1
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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autologous bone marrow or stem cell transplantation (AMBT/SCT)
for metastatic breast cancer describes a medical procedure that
came before the courts frequently in the 1990s. The controversy
over this procedure and the set of circumstances surrounding it
created a “perfect storm” that diffused an unproven and even
dangerous technology to patients before its effectiveness was
appropriately studied. The elements in this perfect storm included
physician, hospital, industry, and consumer demands. These
demands dovetailed with media demand for dramatic life-anddeath stories centered on making villains of managed care
organizations (MCOs) and victims of patients denied access to
certain procedures.
This case illustrates the incongruence and difficulty that judges
confront when asked to consider clinical studies that are presented
as medical evidence during a proceeding. Judges have been given
the responsibility of determining the credibility of clinical studies
submitted as medical evidence and whether to admit them as
evidence. Courts that tried cases on HDC with ABMT/SCT were
not equipped to determine the credibility of the clinical studies
submitted to them as medical evidence. The authors of this article,
and the organization of which they are a part, were observers of
and then active participants in the controversies surrounding this
technology throughout the 1990s.
Though perfect storms that include litigation over healthcare
technologies can still form today, better tools are available to
discern the credibility of medical evidence. In this article, we begin
in Parts I-III by presenting this case history and the controversy
surrounding HDC. Finally, in Part IV, we propose a solution to aid
courts in the future when called to determine the credibility of
clinical trial medical evidence.
I. BACKGROUND
Understanding the issues that surrounded the perfect storm
over HDC with ABMT/SCT for breast cancer requires some
contextual knowledge of breast cancer and the standard treatments
used. Breast cancer is described in stages 0 to IV and a patient’s
prognosis is linked in large part to the stage of disease at the time
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of diagnosis.2 At one end of the spectrum are stages 0 and 1, and if
detected at these stages, more than 95% of the patients can expect
to survive for at least 5 years after diagnosis and treatment.3
Effective treatments are available for this stage of cancer. Initial
treatment almost always involves surgery to remove the tumor,
followed by irradiation of the affected breast. Additional follow-up
(adjuvant) therapy includes chemotherapy and/or hormonal therapy
to prevent recurrence.4
At the other end of the spectrum is metastatic or advanced
(stage IV) breast cancer, for which the outlook is fairly grim and
effective treatment is more elusive; metastatic breast cancer is the
stage of the disease involved in this case history. The 5-year
survival rate is an estimated 26%.5 Advanced breast cancer is
usually treated with various aggressive chemotherapy regimens—
typically a combination of alkylating agents, antibiotics and/or
antimetabolites. Alkylating agents have been considered to be
particularly useful because dose increases are believed to enhance
tumor response rates.6 But the higher the dosage regimen, the more
severe the treatment-related toxicities, which can in some cases
cause death. Major toxicities include liver obstruction, cardiac
disorders (arrhythmia, heart failure, inflammation), pneumonitis,
central nervous system disorders (seizures, neuropathies,
meningitis), gastrointestinal system disorders (nausea, diarrhea,
ulceration, hemorrhage), urinary tract system disorders,
pneumonia, infection, hypertension, and other serious conditions.7
2

Lawrence H. Sobin & Irvin D. Fleming, TNM Classification of Malignant
Tumors, Fifth Edition, 80 CANCER 1803-04 (1997).
3
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, BREAST CANCER FACTS AND FIGURES
2005,
at
11
(2005),
http://www.cancer.org/downloads/STT/
CAFF2005f4PWSecured .pdf.
4
NATIONAL GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, GUIDELINE SYNTHESIS:
MANAGEMENT OF EARLY STAGE BREAST CANCER (2001), available at:
www.guideline.gov.
5
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 11.
6
Edward A. Stadtmauer, Bone Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer,
in Barbara Fowble et al., BREAST CANCER TREATMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO MANAGEMENT, 489-506 (1991).
7
HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT REPORT, ECRI, High-dose
Chemotherapy with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation and/or
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A. The Genesis of HDC with ABMT/SCT for Breast Cancer

In the 1980s, a theory emerged that “more” chemotherapy
might lead to “better” response and improved survival, despite the
fact that no direct evidence was available that any chemotherapy
regimen for advanced breast cancer prolonged survival or
improved patients’ quality of life.8 Since some chemotherapeutic
agents exhibited a steep positive dose-response curve,9 many in the
oncology community inferred that dose escalation would produce a
substantially greater response rate, which in turn would improve
survival. However, very high doses also posed higher risks to
patients by escalating the side effects and impairing or eradicating
the patient’s blood-cell-producing system (which includes the
immune system). Nevertheless, if the immune system could be
quickly restored after HDC, proponents hypothesized that the
procedure might be feasible.10
Clinical researchers devised various ways to restore this
system, which involved harvesting the patient’s stem cells for later
reinfusion, or transplantation, after HDC, to reconstitute the
system. Stem cells could be harvested from bone marrow in a
patient’s hip or from a patient’s circulating blood supply. In
addition, certain growth factors, known as colony stimulating
factors, could be given to try to increase patients’ production of
stem cells before the harvest. The stem cells could then be
reinfused in the patient through an intravenous tube after the HDC.
If the reconstitution of the blood-cell-producing system failed after
HDC, the patient would likely die within weeks or months.
Given that the procedure was very high risk, one might expect
that rigorous testing would be conducted to determine whether it
really worked better than standard chemotherapy. But such testing
Peripheral Blood Cell Transplantation for the Treatment of Metastatic Breast
Cancer, 25, 33 (Feb. 1995) [hereinafter High-dose Chemotherapy] (report on
file with authors).
8
Roger P. A’Hern et al., Does Chemotherapy Improve Survival in
Advanced Breast Cancer? A Statistical Overview, 57 BRIT. J. CANCER 615-18
(1988).
9
High-dose Chemotherapy, supra note 7, at 15.
10
Id. at 24.
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is not required under any type of federal regulations when using
drugs that have already been approved to treat cancer. Thus, an
unproven procedure was available outside of the research setting
from its inception and the only major barrier to its diffusion was
insurance reimbursement. It was considered by many to be a
“cutting edge” procedure and the only hope for a disease that had
few good treatment options.
Proving the relative effectiveness of HDC compared to
standard-dose therapy would require well-designed randomized
clinical trials (RCTs) that compared the two treatments in patients
with similar medical characteristics (e.g., age, stage of disease).
Results from nonrandomized, uncontrolled studies on HDC were
being published, but none of them made the necessary comparisons
to assure that the published results were meaningful. Meanwhile,
the procedure’s popularity grew from the mid-1980s through the
mid-1990s. According to data from the Autologous Blood &
Marrow Transplant Registry—North America, from 1989 to 1992,
the number of HDC with ABMT/SCT procedures for breast cancer
more than tripled. By 1993, more than 2,500 procedures had been
performed.11 Trials on HDC increased as well, but not of the kind
that would yield a definitive answer: 86 studies on HDC with
ABMT/SCT were reported in the Proceedings of the American
Society of Clinical Oncology’s (ASCO) annual meetings from
1984 through 1993; none were RCTs.12 Furthermore, significant
decreases were seen in the number of patients participating in trials
for advanced breast cancer over this period. Patients did not want
to participate in trials because they believed that this new “state of
the art procedure” was their best hope for surviving, and the
procedure was widely available because many oncologists were
willing to perform it. For a patient, participation in a randomized
controlled trial meant that they might be assigned to the group in
11

Phillip A. Rowlings et al., Report from the International Bone Marrow
Transplant Registry and the North American Autologous Bone Marrow
Transplant Registry, CLINICAL TRANSPLANT 101, 101-08 (1993).
12
Rowan T. Chlebowski & L.M. Lillington, A Decade of Breast Cancer
Clinical Investigation: Results as Reported in the Program/Proceedings of the
American Society of Clinical Oncology, 12 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1789, 178995 (1994).
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the trial that received standard chemotherapy, rather than HDC.
Patients wanted what they perceived (and what their treating
physicians claimed) was the best, or only, option, even though no
evidence existed to demonstrate that it was the better than standard
treatment.13
B. The Perfect Storm
The unbridled diffusion of HDC in the 1990s led to a perfect
storm. Many circumstances coalesced to create this storm.
Enthusiasm for performing this procedure was tied to much more
than a belief in its efficacy even though no evidence existed to
prove its efficacy.
National Breast Cancer Coalition patient advocate and breast
cancer survivor, Musa Mayer, aptly described those times in a
recent commentary:14
It took me some time, and a lot of study, to understand
the dynamics of what had actually happened in America
with bone marrow transplants in breast cancer. And how
wishful thinking on the part of patients and oncologists,
public pressure, heart-wrenching media stories of
desperately ill young mothers, political and legislative
mandates for insurance coverage, personal reputations of
researchers, and profit margins of hospitals with transplant
beds to fill all managed to widely promote a toxic and
expensive treatment before there was sufficient evidence of
its safety or efficacy.
. . . [t]he prevailing wisdom of the time was that desperate
circumstances called for desperate measures. Many women
at the time, including my friends vowed to “go out
fighting,” rather than have the longer life and gentler death
that might have been theirs with conventional treatment.
“If I die,” young women would frequently say, “I want my
children to know I did everything I could.” One transplant
13

Id.
Musa Mayer, When Clinical Trials Are Compromised: A Perspective
from a Patient Advocate, 2 PLOS MED. 1060, 1060-61 (2005).
14
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unit actually used this coercive argument as a marketing
ploy. Naively, I believed that doctors could be trusted to
rely on good evidence, especially for a treatment as toxic
and costly as this. Certainly, they would never allow
themselves to be misled by partial evidence or a compelling
theory—that more is better, or that dramatic tumor
response in uncontrolled Phase II trials actually predicted
for clinical benefit.
The procedure was performed by the nation’s leading
oncologists who held important positions. Clinicians were held in
high esteem by patients, colleagues and their professional
communities. Whether they were at first leading oncologists who
performed the procedure or whether they emerged as leaders in the
oncology community as a result of performing HDC is difficult to
discern. Physician advocates for HDC hailed from renowned
institutions such as Sloan Kettering in New York and Duke
University in North Carolina. They published articles in
prestigious medical journals such as the Journal of Clinical
Oncology, the Journal of the National Cancer Institute, and the
New England Journal of Medicine. These same leaders also
became involved in the contentious insurance issues related to
access to the procedure.
Certain experiences of the authors suggest that some of these
oncologists also had vested intellectual and financial interests in
the procedure. Vested intellectual interests became apparent when
we obtained external peer review on the preliminary draft of our
1995 technology assessment on the procedure. Upon learning the
results of ECRI’s assessment, a renowned oncologist from a
recognized cancer Center of Excellence declared that they could
not possibly be valid—not because of the methodology we used,
but because the results of our analysis led, in her opinion, to the
wrong conclusions.15
Vested financial interests of some oncologists enhanced
diffusion of this technology, but the way this occurred was more
complex. In addition to the procedure being performed by the most
famous oncology researchers at premier institutions, oncologists in
15

High-dose Chemotherapy, supra note 7.
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community hospitals also wished to perform the procedure but did
not have the wherewithal to do so. The technical expertise and
facilities required to care for these patients led some community
hospitals to contract with for-profit centers that offered the
procedure—centers in which some famous oncologists had a
financial stake. Such centers were purely enterprises created to
bring in revenue by performing a high-risk procedure whose
efficacy was unknown. It was common for a single HDC with
ABMT procedure to cost $150,000 to $200,000 in the early to mid1990s, although procedure advocates worked to lower costs by
modifying HDC procedures and creating outpatient facilities to
perform it.
Another factor in the evolution of this perfect storm was that
some oncology professional societies worked with a for-profit
company to lobby state legislators to enact state mandates
requiring health insurers to pay for HDC with ABMT/SCT. At
times these efforts were successful. These mandates were matched
by decisions at the federal level by the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management to declare that health insurance plans covering
federal employees and their families would be required to cover
the procedure.16
Physician enthusiasm for the procedure was, however, only one
element in the perfect storm. Breast cancer became a renowned
cause in the 1990s, which marked the advent of an era in which
patient organizations such as the Susan G. Koman Foundation
became nationally known through events such as the Race for the
Cure. The National Breast Cancer Coalition also formed and
achieved the signal success of obtaining extraordinary amounts of
funding for breast cancer research from the U.S. Department of
Defense—a very non-traditional funding source for cancer
research.
The high public profile of the disease helped to build an
emotional response to the procedure with the help of celebrities
and the media. Celebrities affected by breast cancer were willing to
16

ECRI, The Impact of Inappropriate Diffusion of Technology, HEALTH
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT NEWS (ECRI, Plymouth Meeting, PA) Nov/Dec
1994, at 1, 6.
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talk publicly about their experiences and, while most cases of
breast cancer occur in older women, a disproportionate number of
tragic cases in younger women were covered in the news media.
This coverage created greater awareness of breast cancer, but also
skewed perceptions about the true prevalence and incidence of the
condition.
Another element in this perfect storm was the rapid conversion
of the nation’s health insurance system to a managed-care model.
Managed care organizations (MCOs also known as health
maintenance organizations or HMOs) were initially considered a
socially progressive attempt to merge insurance payment with
better controlled delivery and cost-effectiveness of care. In theory,
this merger would slow the spiraling costs of healthcare while
increasing the quality of care for patients. But the rapid and ragged
implementation of managed care at that time led to a strong
backlash from doctors, hospitals, and patients. A perception
developed that cost was the sole consideration in MCOs’ decision
making about what to cover. The locus of coverage decision
making, which resided with medical directors of MCOs, presented
an unacceptable conflict of interest to the public which challenged
the legitimacy of managed care. Many different constituencies and
factors play important roles in coverage policy making of managed
care plans: the press, lawmakers, consumers, healthcare
professionals, healthcare industry representatives, government and
state mandates, business and contractual obligations of
beneficiaries’ insurance contracts, and the scientific evidence on
the technology in question.
Strengthening the storm were media demands for dramatic lifeand-death stories centered on making villains of MCOs and
victims of patients denied access to certain procedures. HDC with
ABMT/HDC provided the perfect media opportunity. The media
presented an extraordinarily one-sided perspective that contributed
heavily to the perception that the procedure must be good because
it was expensive and MCOs opposed it. Time Magazine’s cover on
January 22, 1996, featured a physician wearing a surgical mask
gagging his mouth, along with the bold headlines “Special
Investigation. What Your Doctor Can’t Tell You. An in-depth look
at managed care and one woman’s fight to survive.”
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The final, though not the least important, element in this
perfect storm is the issue of medical uncertainty. That is,
statistically based studies show how populations, not individual
patients, will fare under a procedure. Thus, even if a procedure is
rarely effective, when life is at stake it is common for desperate
people to hope that they are the exception to the rule—that they
will be the one to benefit. This issue is particularly challenging for
the legal profession, which most often deals with compelling
individual cases and is not usually in a position to judge whether
procedures should be performed by the medical profession.
Business contract arrangements among employers, employees,
and HMOs also contributed to the storm and became the basis for
disputes entering the legal system over access to the procedure.
These disputes are well laid out in a body of work produced by
Peter D. Jacobson, J.D., MPH et al.17 One of the key points in this
body of work is that the court’s reliance on expert witnesses was
problematic because the nation’s most credible witnesses were
proponents of the technology—highly respected oncologists. Other
highly respected oncologists who believed differently from the
proponents refused to testify for the defense. Why these credible
opposing voices refused to testify is a matter of some speculation,
but it was clearly difficult to counter a mounting consensus of
support for HDC in the profession. Therefore, the defense in these
cases often had to rely on the testimony of insurance company
medical directors, who with rare exception were not oncologists
and also held little credibility with juries because of public
sentiment about MCOs.
In the absence of access to credible expert witnesses, MCOs
that were sued sometimes mounted their defense of coverage
denials for HDC by citing technology assessment reports (also
sometimes called systematic reviews) such as the one ECRI
published in 1995. Several reports showed that no evidence was
available to prove that the procedure was more effective than—or
even as effective as—standard chemotherapy. Some health plans
17

PETER D. JACOBSON, RICHARD A. RETTIG, & WADE M. AUBRY,
LITIGATING THE SCIENCE OF BREAST CANCER TREATMENT (forthcoming 2006)
(manuscript at 43, on file with authors).
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also succumbed to the public tidal wave and pressure of expensive
litigation and approved coverage for an unproven costly
procedure.18
The technology assessments and methods used to analyze data
were drawn into the eye of the storm. From the 1980s through the
mid-1990s, as the science of systematic review of medical
literature was evolving, the notion of pooling biomedical data for
meta-analysis of multiple clinical studies was neither fully
developed nor generally accepted. And when such analyses were
performed, only data from randomized controlled trials (RCTs)
were used because RCTs are generally considered the “gold
standard” for evaluating the efficacy of medical procedures.
However, for many healthcare technologies, gold standard RCTs
often are not conducted—only uncontrolled studies are available.
So the question for those engaged in systematic review was how to
proceed. In the early 1990s, no group in the field of technology
assessment had yet explored pooling data from uncontrolled
studies—which were the only studies then available on HDC with
ABMT/SCT.
Ultimately in 1995, ECRI published a 328-page systematic
review on HDC with ABMT/SCT for the treatment of metastatic
breast cancer using the only available data, which were lower
quality than gold standard RCT data. The methods of analysis and
results of this landmark review are summarized below.
II. ECRI’S CONCERNS GENERATE LANDMARK DATA ANALYSIS
The elements of this perfect storm compelled ECRI to
undertake a landmark systematic review of the available data on
HDC with ABMT/SCT for metastatic breast cancer. ECRI was
motivated by its 30-year mission to improve the safety and cost
effectiveness of healthcare and its dedication to providing
objective, evidence-based information to the healthcare community
for informed decision making. Another motivation was the concern
18

New Wave of Diffusion of HDC with ABMT for Breast Cancer: An
Answer to the Efficacy Question?, HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT NEWS,
(ECRA, ECRI, Plymouth Meeting, PA) Mar/Apr. 1996, at 1, 8.
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that premature diffusion of this procedure outside of RCTs was
misleading and harming patients, and that no one was giving
patients complete information. ECRI learned how some patients
were being misled after conversations with patients who contacted
ECRI for information and from patient advocates, such as Musa
Mayer, at the National Breast Cancer Coalition. ECRI was aware
that the procedure was being presented to desperately ill patients as
their last and only hope without being told of its serious risks.
Patients were misled to believe that a high tumor response rate to
HDC translated to longer survival. It did not. Some women who
survived the procedure were trotted out like poster children to
provide testimonials of the procedure’s efficacy. Women who were
denied the procedure were said to have been denied life-saving
treatment. Unfortunately, patients who died from the treatment had
no voice, and the oncology community was all too ready to
minimize or not acknowledge treatment-related deaths.
Notably, many clinical proponents of HDC claimed that there
was a “subset of breast cancer patients” that benefited from HDC,
yet no one had ever been able to define that subset. ECRI wanted
to find out if that subset really existed.
A. Elements of a High-Quality Systematic Review
Systematic reviews have the ability to yield answers that
individual studies cannot because a systematic review examines an
entire body of evidence, that is, all the relevant studies. Two key
elements of a high-quality systematic review are transparency
about the methods and data used to conduct the analysis in the
review and the comprehensiveness of the review. Transparency is
important for reproducibility of results. Comprehensiveness is
important so that all relevant data and information are considered
to arrive at the conclusions. Comprehensiveness begins with a
thorough and exhaustive search for all the relevant published
medical literature. Comprehensiveness also refers to thorough
testing of the robustness of all the analyses performed.
For its analysis, ECRI undertook the most comprehensive
search for data on HDC with ABMT/SCT that any technology
assessment organization had undertaken up to that time. ECRI
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searched 12 databases to identify clinical studies on the procedure.
Those searches identified 1544 articles that were retrieved and
reviewed to identify trials with relevant data for possible analysis.
ECRI found no controlled trials that made head-to-head
comparisons of HDC and standard chemotherapy.19 At the time,
several RCTs were in progress but having trouble accruing
patients.
1. Problems with the Quality of HDC Evidence
In reviewing the 1544 articles, ECRI identified many critical
weaknesses in the oncology literature.20 These weaknesses made
many studies unusable because of insufficient, uninterpretable, or
biased data. For example, studies often combined results for
patients with different stages of disease and other important
variables known to affect treatment and treatment outcomes. Data
from such studies were uninterpretable. Treatment-related
morbidity and mortality data, which are very important given the
toxicity of HDC, were reported inconsistently or not at all. During
its examination of the evidence, ECRI found that many studies
used a euphemism for describing the deaths that occurred within
30 days of treatment as a result of the treatment. These events were
often reported simply as “unevaluable patients.”
Another study quality issue was that many studies enrolled
only those patients whose disease was known to respond to
chemotherapy. These patients were given a course of “induction
therapy”—treatment intended to determine whether or not their
tumors were chemo-responsive. While selecting patients whose
tumors are most likely to respond is certainly legitimate from a
clinical perspective, this practice in a scientific study introduces a
serious design flaw. It biases results because only patients with the
optimal chance for response were entered into many of the HDC
studies. Standard chemotherapy studies did not employ such
criteria—those studies enrolled patients with optimal and
19

High-dose Chemotherapy, supra note 7, at 34-36.
Id. at 68-71 (noting “dissimilar HDC regimens and dosages,” differing
prior treatment for patients, and patient selection as some of the problems in
study design).
20
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suboptimal chances of response. ECRI’s analysis showed that this
practice in HDC studies was positively correlated with reports of
improved survival rates over standard-dose treatment. Thus the
benefits of HDC were overstated unless the influence of this
patient selection bias difference was accounted for.
HDC studies also adhered to no standard definition or regimen
for HDC. HDC regimens in studies had dosages ranging from 2 to
10 times those of standard chemotherapy regimens. The
combinations of drugs given varied also. ECRI identified dozens of
2-drug and 3-drug combinations in the literature on HDC. Some
regimens included administering biologic growth factors known as
colony stimulating factors; others did not. These growth factors
were intended to stimulate the patient’s production of blood cells
to ensure an adequate harvest of stem cells for the transplant
procedure that would follow HDC.
Another important weakness of many HDC studies was that
patient characteristics were vaguely described. Important
characteristics such as those in Table 1, infra, which are linked to
patient prognosis (and appropriate treatment), were poorly reported
or not reported at all in many studies.
Finally, proponents of the technology often supported their
assertion of the efficacy of HDC by referencing data from meeting
abstracts—short summaries of trials that were never published in
full in the peer-reviewed literature. Meeting abstracts were of
abysmally poor quality with incomplete and vague information—
ECRI had to exclude them from analysis.
B. ECRI’s Analytic Methods
Given the absence of RCTs, ECRI analysts identified a
statistical method to use on data from uncontrolled studies to make
indirect comparisons between HDC and standard-dose therapy.
Although indirect comparisons have inherent weaknesses, it was
the best available option to try to find an answer about whether
HDC was more effective than standard chemotherapy. (Since the
time of ECRI’s analysis of data from uncontrolled studies, the
international health services research community has developed
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standards for analyzing data from uncontrolled studies.)21 Given
that none of the ongoing multicenter RCTs were expected to
accrue sufficient numbers of patients because patients did not want
to enter trials when the procedure was widely available, no one
knew whether RCTs would ever be completed.
From the 1544 articles, ECRI identified 40 uncontrolled studies
of HDC with ABMT/SCT on a total of 1,017 patients that provided
sufficient data to pool together for ECRI’s analysis. ECRI also
obtained unpublished data from the North American Autologous
Bone Marrow Transplant Registry (NAABMTR). This group had
created a registry of data on HDC with ABMT/SCT from many
centers around the world.
ECRI identified standard chemotherapy RCTs with patient
groups that had medical characteristics similar to patients in the
uncontrolled HDC studies. The literature searches identified 35
RCTs of standard chemotherapy, which represented data on a total
of 4,889 patients that could be pooled to make comparisons to
outcomes of HDC patients.
After data were pooled on similar patients from HDC and
standard-dose studies, analysts used a statistical technique called
meta-regression to see which, if any, patient characteristics led to
better outcomes with HDC than with standard chemotherapy. In
layman’s terms, meta-regression provides a way to explore
differences in the characteristics of patients to see how any
differences in characteristics might affect treatment outcomes.
Characteristics are grouped together and run through a model and
then regrouped in different ways and rerun through a model to see
what the outcomes are for each group of characteristics. This
method would enable analysts to define any subset of patients that
might benefit from the procedure. See Table 1.
Table 1. Patient characteristics ECRI analyzed to try to
identify patient subset that might benefit from HDC/ABMT
1.
2.

Treatment regimen given (including induction, purging, CSFs)
Age

21

Donna F. Stroup et al., Meta-analysis of Observational Studies in
Epidemiology, 283 JAMA 2008, 2008-12 (2000).
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Estrogen receptor status (positive or negative)
Response to previous hormonal therapy
Menopausal status
Previous chemotherapy for metastatic disease
Previous adjunctive chemotherapy (for nonmetastatic disease)
Severity of metastasis:
a. Lung
b. Liver
c. Bone
d. Skin
e. Soft tissues
f. Lymphatics
g. Contralateral breast
h. Viscera
Number of sites of metastasis

For the regression model, analysts used 61 treatment groups
from 35 standard chemotherapy RCTs. These groups of patients
had characteristics similar to those in HDC studies. Fourteen
regression model groups were analyzed for each of 7 outcome
variables. See Table 2 below. The outcomes ECRI considered
reflect both the outcomes that ECRI considered important as well
as outcomes ECRI believed were misleading, but had been used
widely in the oncology community to assess efficacy, such as
response rates and response duration. ECRI found that no scientific
evidence supported the theory that tumor response rates correlate
to improvements in survival. In fact, some evidence suggests that
tumor response rates and improved survival are not directly linked.
ECRI was also interested in quality of life after HDC because of
the high toxicity of the treatment, but no studies evaluated this, so
ECRI had no data to address this important outcome.
Table 2. Outcomes ECRI Assessed
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Complete and partial (objective) tumor response rate*
Median response duration*
1-year disease-free (progression-free) survival
2-year disease-free (progression-free) survival
Median overall survival (duration)
1-year overall survival**
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2-year overall survival**
*Complete means that no tumor could be detected upon
clinical exam or imaging; partial means that the tumor shrank
by 50% or more.
**The standard length of survival time that is considered
indicative of remission is 5 years; however, the longest follow-up
that was available in HDC was 1 and 2 years.

C. Early Death Rates
Patients undergoing HDC run a substantial risk of lifethreatening infection due to the total suppression of their immune
system and severe toxicity of chemotherapy to major organs—
heart, liver, kidneys. ECRI analyzed the early death rates over
time. These rates were reported in 31 studies from 1984 to 1994.
One might expect that over the many years during which a highrisk procedure is performed, clinical experience with the procedure
and accumulating knowledge would yield lower death and
complication rates. ECRI’s review of data over the 10 years from
1984 to 1994 found no trend toward improvement in death rates
from HDC. In fact, a slight trend toward an increase in early deaths
was seen in the last two years (1993 through 1994) of studies
reporting early deaths.22

Table 3. Early deaths rates from HDC over a 10-year
period
HDC Studies
% Early Deaths
Published in Years: Number of Studies (Mean +- SE)
1984 – 1994
31
10.5 +- 1.4%
1990 – 1994
25
9.7 +- 1.7%

22

High-dose Chemotherapy, supra note 7, at 25, 33.
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1991 – 1994
1992 – 1994
1993 – 1994
1994

17
14
7
5

9.4 +- 2.1%
10.5 +-2.4%
14.4 +- 3.4%
16.6 +-4.3%

1. ECRI’s Results
Based on published data and the additional data ECRI obtained
from bone marrow transplant registry, ECRI found:
• No evidence of benefit for HDC/ABMT/ASCR
compared to standard chemotherapy in any group when
patients were matched for important characteristics.
• Evidence of harm for all outcome measures except
response rate.
• Substantial evidence for decreased median response
duration, median survival time, and one-year overall
survival for patients given HDC/ABMT/ASCR.
• Treatment-related death rates were not improving over
time.
• Patients receiving optimal standard chemotherapy
regimens that were available at the time had better
outcomes than patients given HDC/ABMT/ASCR. 23
Based on these findings, ECRI publicly made several
recommendations:
• Extremely poor quality of oncologic literature must be
improved.
• Editors of oncologic journals should ensure that studies
adequately report details of patient characteristics and
outcome measures, including deaths.
• “Meeting abstracts” can not be considered legitimate
sources of results.
• The public and patients should be informed of the
absence of demonstrated benefits.
• Patients considering the treatment should be informed
23

Id. at 1-3.
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of its potentially significant risks.
The treatment should be limited to active randomized
controlled trials only.

III. HDC EPILOGUE
Soon after ECRI’s report was released, the Journal of Clinical
Oncology published the first RCT to report on HDC with
ABMT/SCT compared to standard chemotherapy.24 This was a
watershed event because this South African trial from University
of Witwatersrand Medical School, Johannesburg reported a
significantly higher response rate for HDC than standard
chemotherapy. At the May 1999 ASCO meeting, the author,
Bezwoda, reported continued positive results of follow-up from
this trial while four other RCTs from the U.S. and Europe reported
disappointing results from HDC compared to standard
chemotherapy.
Bezwoda’s results led to an on-site audit of his research data by
an international committee which reported egregious and unethical
discrepancies in the work, including that no participant in the trial
had signed an informed consent.25 His trial publication was
ultimately retracted in 2001.26
The first full publication of the largest RCT of HDC with
ABMT/SCT for metastatic breast cancer to date came from
Edward A. Stadtmauer, et al., at the University of Pennsylvania,
and was first published online by the New England Journal of
Medicine in March 2000 (and in the print journal in April 2000).27
24

W.R. Bezwoda et al., High-dose Chemotherapy With Hematopoietic
Rescue as Primary Treatment for Metastatic Breast Cancer: A Randomized
Trial, 13 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2483-89 (1995).
25
R.B. Weiss et al., High-Dose Chemotherapy for High-Risk Primary
Breast Cancer: An On-Site Review of the Bezwoda Study, 335 LANCET 999, 9991003 (2000).
26
Retraction, 19 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2973 (2001).
27
Edward A. Stadtmauer et al., Conventional-Dose Chemotherapy
Compared with High-Dose Chemotherapy Plus Autologous Hematopoietic
Stem-Cell Transplantation for Metastatic Breast Cancer, 342 NEW ENG. L. REV.
1069, 1069-76 (2000).
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Stadtmauer found no significant difference in overall survival rate
between HDC and standard dose chemotherapy. Several more
RCTs eventually published full results over the few years that
came to essentially the same conclusions as ECRI did in its 1995
report.
IV. WHAT WE CAN DO TO PREPARE FOR THE NEXT PERFECT
STORM: RECOMMENDATIONS
We make two recommendations for judges. First, that
participating in training sessions on the nature and use of scientific
methods in medical research is valuable for judges. This is based
on our experience in presenting the HDC case study to
approximately 80 federal and state judges and engaging with them
in dialogue about the value of those sessions. The sessions are not
intended to turn judges into statisticians or medical researchers.
Rather, the intent was to introduce the concepts of medical
research enterprise as it exists today, and as it has existed
historically. Revisiting the past to review what has taken place and
learn how we can better the system in the future is important.
Judges involved in the HDC cases of the 1990s could have asked
more penetrating questions if they have been exposed both to the
historical record and to the techniques for discerning credible
evidence that are available today.
Our second recommendation is to develop a bench book for
adjudicating medical technology cases. Such a book could provide
informational tools for pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures that
involve evidence from health services research. Because so many
dynamic cases are in the courts today, the bench book should be
underpinned with an ongoing relational database of cases that use
health services research as evidence. For example, the database
would have fields that categorize the specific disease or ailment
that is the subject of the case, the treatment or technology in
question, the procedural posture of the case, the type of health
services research entered into evidence or referred to as part of the
factual record, and relevant precedents. Other data fields may
include, where available, the specific type of defendant (e.g.,
health plan, third-party administrator, employer), whether
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alternative dispute resolution was utilized, precedents that were
cited, and other information. The database would feed
development of the bench book itself and provide fodder for
research articles for publication.
One section of the bench book would include a glossary and
nomenclature of evidentiary terms derived from health services
research, illustrated by the case law and amplified by explanation
of the sources and the validity of the scientific foundation of the
case law would be cited, as appropriate. For example, mention of a
“consensus statement” that appeared in a case would be defined,
noting whether it was produced by the National Institutes of
Health, a clinical specialty society, or a pharmaceutical company,
and what the distinctions among these are.
Another section of the bench book would be a procedural
checklist. That is, there would be a description of typical
adjudication procedures in which evidence for health services
research is proffered. This could be subdivided into sections such
as the stages of a trial (e.g., status conference, discovery, motion to
dismiss). It would discuss the evidentiary tools applied in each of
the professional benchmarks. It would note when health services
research has been used and also where it might be used in the
future.
A third section would include “frequently asked questions” that
presiding judges are likely to encounter. For example, “What
factors, other than a review of relevant health services research,
might go into an insurer’s coverage decision?” Or, “What is the
meaning of FDA ‘approval’ for a pharmaceutical or medical
device?”
A fourth section of the bench book would contain resources or
examples of instructions which judges could offer to a jury to
enable them to weigh the medical evidence presented by expert
witnesses. For example, there could be a subsection on
“exceptional introduction of evidence” including clinical practice
guidelines, technology assessments, and other clinical protocols.
There could also be a subsection on application and amici briefs
that considers the use of evidence that was not proffered at trial.
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CONCLUSION
The authors believe that educational and informational tools
can make a significant positive impact on the judicial system, the
medical system, and on the ultimate beneficiary of our efforts—the
patient.

